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I. INTRODUCfiON 
If we consider constitutional law as a practice, it is clear that 
both originalism and precedent play an important role. Neither 
one is going to vanquish the other, at least not any time soon. 
We can engage in academic debate about originalism versus 
stare decisis, as if they were rival modes of interpretation that 
could operate to the exclusion of the other. But the question of 
practical importance is one of degree and emphasis: in cases 
where these two sources of authority arguably point in different 
directions, which one should have a greater claim to our alle-
giance? 
Originalism- interpreting the text in accordance with the 
understanding of the Framers-is arguably the more fundamen-
tal principle. Insofar as our legal system rests on legal positivism 
or the command theory of law-which it largely does, at least 
with respect to enacted law-then the Constitution must be re-
garded as the supreme command of the ultimate lawgiver, the 
People. When asking what command the People have given, it 
makes sense to ask what the People understood the provisions of 
the Constitution to mean at the time they were adopted. Thus, 
when questions of first impression arise, or disputes erupt about 
whether particular precedents should be overruled, nearly all 
Justices seem to regard evidence of original understanding as be-
ing relevant to resolving the issue.1 
* Charles Keller Beekman Professor, Columbia Law School. 
I. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional The-
ory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765,1766 (1997) ("Although there are 
very few strict originalists, virtually all practitioners of and commentators on constitu-
tional law accept that original meaning has some relevance to constitutional interpreta-
tion.''). 
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Yet if originalism has a strong claim to superiority in theory, 
stare decisis-resolving cases in accordance with the previous 
judgments of courts that have considered the question-
undoubtedly dominates in terms of practice. By some counts, 80 
percent of the justificatory arguments in Supreme Court consti-
tutional law opinions are grounded in precedent,2 and a very 
large proportion of cases are decided without any argument 
based on the text of the Constitution or any reference to histori-
cal evidence bearing on original understanding. I would add that 
no Supreme Court Justice since the days of John Marshall has 
been able to write constitutional law opinions without giving 
substantial weight to precedent-and this includes all of the cur-
rent Justices, no matter how committed they may be in the ab-
stract to originalism. 3 
Thus, both originalism and stare decisis are important to our 
constitutional system. The relevant question is which way we 
should tilt in cases of doubt. Simplifying a bit, the question of tilt 
can be reduced to how strong a version of stare decisis the Jus-
tices should apply in constitutional cases. Should the Justices 
embrace a weak theory of precedent, regarding prior judgments 
as presumptively correct but subject to overruling based on a 
demonstration of error? Or should the Justices adopt a strong 
theory of precedent, regarding prior judgments as legally binding 
and subject to overruling only on a showing of some special justi-
fication beyond mere error-such as a demonstration that the 
precedent has become unworkable or that it conflicts with other 
precedent?4 
2. See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive 
Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 567 (1991). Based on a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of all constitu-
tional law opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan over a ten year period, the au-
thors report that both Justices relied on arguments from precedent more than 80 percent 
of the time in majority opinions (somewhat less in nonmajority opinions). I d. at 594, Ta-
ble 3. Textual, historical, and structural arguments accounted for less than 10 percent of 
the argument in Rehnquist majority opinions; just over 6 percent in Brennan majority 
opinions. !d. Since Rehnquist and Brennan were outliers on the Court during this period, 
both in terms of their substantive constitutional views and their professed interpretive 
theories, presumably the opinions of more centrist, pragmatically-oriented Justices rely 
on precedent to at least an equal degree. 
3. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Con-
stitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 570,582-83 (2001). 
4. Philosophically-inclined legal scholars tend to draw a sharp distinction between 
weak and strong versions of precedent, the key point of differentiation being whether the 
decision maker adheres to precedent notwithstanding a conviction that it is otherwise in 
error. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 592-93 (1987). Al-
though I follow this convention here, I am not sure that this sharp distinction accurately 
describes judicial practice. Instead, judicial practice seems to range over a spectrum from 
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In this essay, I argue that adopting a strong theory of prece-
dent in constitutional law would have at least one consequence 
that I regard as desirable: it would promote judicial restraint. 
This is not, to be sure, the only relevant value by which to evalu-
ate the choice.5 There are obviously other factors to consider, 
such as the alleged need to encourage "flexibility" in the inter-
pretation of the Constitution given the difficulty of amending it.6 
But judicial restraint is the only value I will focus on here, leav-
ing the more complete (and complicated) weighing or pros and 
cons for another day. 
In arguing for a strong theory of precedent on grounds of 
judicial restraint, I recognize that I am staking out an idiosyn-
cratic position. Judicial restraint is generally thought to be a con-
servative value, yet most conservative constitutional law scholars 
today seem to favor a weak theory of precedent. Gary Lawson 
and Michael Paulsen, for example, have argued that precedent 
should always give way to a showin~ of inconsistency with the 
original meaning of the Constitution. Randy Barnett and Steve 
Calabresi, although adopting more nuanced positions, are sym-
pathetic with this view. In contrast, defenders of a precedent-
based approach, such as David Strauss, are more likely to be lib-
erals.9 To some extent, I suspect these positions have been 
giving no weight to precedent to giving it conclusive authority, depending on context and 
the proclivities of the individual judge. For purposes of the present essay, however, noth-
ing turns on whether precedent-following behavior is better characterized by a dichot-
omy or by a spectrum. My claim is simply that the further one pushes the Justices of the 
Supreme Court toward the "binding" pole with regard to constitutional precedent, the 
more restrained the Court will become. 
5. In a previous essay, I argued that precedent-following is superior to originalism 
when assessed against a range of values embraced by conservatives. See Thomas W. 
Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 509 (1996). Although there is over-
lap in the arguments, some of the values considered there-such as skepticism about us-
ing human reason to order society-are not considered here. 
6. The argument that constitutional law requires a weak theory of precedent in 
order to permit constitutional change can be traced to Justice Brandeis's dissenting opin-
ion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-11 (1932). Brandeis, of 
course, wanted to encourage the Court to overrule decisions giving constitutional protec-
tion to contract and property rights, in order to facilitate more aggressive government 
intervention in the economy. 
7. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Prece-
dent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005). 
8. See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radi-
cal as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, 
and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311 (2005). 
9. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996); see also Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreword: 
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and the Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
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shaped by controversies over particular precedents, most notably 
Roe v. Wade, 10 and by the direction a decision overruling these 
controversial precedents would likely take, given the current 
composition of the Supreme Court. My claim is that, abstracting 
away from these controversies and contingencies about the po-
litical values of the current Court, someone who believes in judi-
cial restraint should favor a strong theory of precedent, at least 
in constitutional law. 
My remarks are divided into three parts. I will first define 
what I mean by judicial restraint and set forth some reasons why 
it is a good thing. Then I will offer some thoughts as to why, in 
theory, a strong theory of precedent is more likely to lead to ju-
dicial restraint than a weak theory of precedent. Finally, I will 
offer some casual empirical evidence that I think supports the 
claimed relationship between the theory of precedent and judi-
cial restraint. 
II. THE VALUE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
Judicial restraint is a contestable concept open to a variety 
of definitions.'' It is important to define the term so as to avoid 
rendering the argument circular. Sometimes judicial restraint is 
defined to mean fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion.12 If this is what judicial restraint means, then obviously 
originalism-and only originalism-promotes judicial restraint. 
Other times judicial restraint is defined to mean fidelity to prior 
precedent. 13 If that is what judicial restraint means, then obvi-
ously stare decisis-and only stare decisis-promotes judicial re-
straint. 
As I use the term, judicial restraint refers to a style of judg-
ing that produces the fewest surprises. Restrained judges render 
decisions that conform to what an experienced lawyer, familiar 
with the facts of the case and the relevant legal authorities, 
37-41 (2003); Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in 
Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 67 (1988). 
10. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
II. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 304-34 (1996); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 72 
U. CoLO. L. REV. 1139, 1144-74 (2002). 
12. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 
VA. L. REv. 1, 52 (2001) (noting that "if one believes in the determinacy of the underly-
ing legal texts" then judicial restraint may mean "fidelity to the texts themselves."). 
13. See Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death of Neces-
sity and the Transformation of the Supreme Coun's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 1119, 1178 n. 320 (1995), cited in Nelson, supra note 12, at 51. 
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would counsel a client would be the most likely outcome. A re-
strained judge, in this sense, is not necessarily deferential to 
other political institutions. A restrained judge is simply a highly 
predictable judge, and this may include being predictably non-
deferential to other institutions. For example, suppose a State 
were to enact a law punishing persons who spit on the American 
flag. Since the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently struck down 
flag desecration laws/ an experienced lawyer would predict that 
the flag-spitting law would also be invalidated. A restrained 
judge would reach the same result, even though this involves in-
validating a democratically-enacted statute, and hence in this 
sense entails imposing the judicial will against the wishes of 
other political institutions.15 
Defining judicial restraint in terms of predictability is not 
circular in terms of whether originalism or precedent-following is 
more likely to lead to restraint. Restraint in this sense simply re-
quires that the judge adhere to whatever method produces the 
most easily-predicted results. If originalism is the best predictor, 
then the restrained judge would use originalism; if the tenets of 
socialism are the best predictor, then the judge would follow the 
tenets of socialism, and so forth. In other words, the value to be 
maximized-judicial restraint in the sense of a minimum of sur-
prises-does not logically entail any particular judicial method-
ology; the question of which methodology produces the most re-
straint is contingent upon other features of the legal system. 
If judicial restraint means predictability, then restrained 
judges are plodders, not innovators. They are long on diligence, 
and short on imagination. They are utterly conventional and bor-
ing. How can something so dull be a good thing? 
One reason should immediately spring to mind: In a democ-
racy, innovation in law and policy is supposed to come from offi-
cials elected by the People, not from unelected judges. The ten-
sion between democracy and judicial activism has been 
rehearsed so endlessly in the literature that it is virtually as bor-
14. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989). 
15. Both Posner and Young, supra note 11, prefer definitions of judicial restraint 
that stress a court's willingness to subordinate its value preferences to those of other gov-
ernmental institutions. Although my definition is different, I would note that the more 
predictable judicial decisions become, the more this tends to enhance the power of other 
political institutions, because parties seeking change will have to turn to other institutions 
to obtain it. In this sense, judicial predictability may be the best guarantor that courts 
remain subordinate to other political institutions. 
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ing as judicial restraint itself. 16 In an attempt to be original, I 
would explain the connection between judicial restraint and de-
mocracy in the following way. If judges are restrained, that is, if 
they adhere to the jurisprudence of no surprises, then the pro-
ponents of social change through law will have to look elsewhere 
in order to achieve their reforms. The logical place for them to 
look is to elected politicians-Congress and the President. Judi-
cial restraint changes the payoffs to interest groups to seeking 
legal change through litigation-and it does so in a way that 
channels ~ressure for legal change to electorally accountable in-
stitutions. 7 In so doing, it reinforces the basic theory on which 
our political system is grounded. 
A second reason why judicial restraint is a good thing is that 
it protects expectations and reduces retroactivity in legal deci-
sion making. Legal change is not ruled out. The Constitution can 
be amended, statutes can be enacted, new administrative regula-
tions can be promulgated. But these sorts of changes occur pro-
spectively, allowing individuals to adjust their behavior before 
they take effect. If legal change is prospective, and courts fore-
swear legal change through litigation, then individuals can be 
confident the law applied by courts will be the same as the law 
on the books. We tend to forget how liberating this kind of secu-
rity of expectation is. As the experience of many former com-
munist or developing countries trying to develop a rule of law 
tradition reminds us, uncertainty about how the courts will apply 
the law can chill dissent and make it difficult to engage in long-
ranging planning and investment for the future. 
A third reason why judicial restraint is a good thing is that it 
promotes equal treatment, in terms of treating similarly-situated 
litigants similarly. The jurisprudence of no surprises means that 
today's litigant is treated the same way yesterday's litigant was 
treated-for good or ill. Obviously, if both are treated ill there is 
reason to complain about the legal system. But insofar as we re-
gard equal treatment as an element of fairness that exists inde-
16. A great deal of modern constitutional law scholarship consists of attempts to 
explain away the so-called "countermajoritarian difficulty," that is, to explain why, not-
withstanding our commitment to rule by the People, it is okay for judges to be innovators 
in matters of social policy. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
(1980) (seeking to explain how the innovations of the Warren Court were consistent with 
a basic commitment to democracy). 
17. See Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism 
After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoLY 219 (1997) (discussing variables that influence 
interest group choice whether to seek change through judicial innovation or conventional 
legislative action). 
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pendent of the substantive justice of the law, judicial restraint 
promotes fairness. And remember-there are ways to change 
the law other than judicial innovation. 
Finally, and related to the last point, judicial restraint helps 
judges resist pressure to bend the rules in ways that operate to 
the disadvantage of unpopular claimants or minorities. Justice 
Scalia made an analogous argument in his famous article about 
the importance of a jurisprudence of rules, 18 but I think the point 
carries even more force when expressed in terms of judicial re-
straint. When we look at the problems of emerging democracies, 
we can see that two of the most important functions courts can 
perform are resolving legal disputes in an impartial manner, and 
assuring that executive officials adhere to the law. A restrained 
judiciary is in a much stronger position to perform these func-
tions, because such a judiciary can claim to be doing no more or 
less than what it always does-enforcing established legal princi-
ples. Moreover, a restrained judiciary will not have dissipated 
any of its institutional capital through the pursuit of controver-
sial social reforms. To the extent that the maintenance of these 
rule of law values is probably the most important contribution 
the judiciary makes to society, this gives us a further reason to 
prefer judicial restraint. 
In sum, judicial restraint means judicial predictability. Judi-
cial predictability is a good thing because it promotes the use of 
democratically accountable institutions in achieving legal 
change, protects expectations, promotes equality of treatment 
among litigants, and makes it easier for judges to protect un-
popular litigants. 
III. STARE DECISIS AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
How do originalism and stare decisis compare in terms of 
achieving these benefits of judicial restraint? As always, the 
judgment must be made in comparative terms. No interpretative 
approach will be perfectly constraining.19 Arguments from text 
and original understanding can be manipulated, by emphasizing 
some sources rather than others, and by varying the level of gen-
erality at which the original understanding is sought. Arguments 
from precedent can be manipulated, by emphasizing some 
18. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. On. L. REV. 1175 
(1989). 
19. See Adrian Vcrrneule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The 
Trouble with lntratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 768 (2000). 
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precedents or language in precedents rather than others, and by 
varying the level of generality at which the precedent is inter-
preted. How then do we choose? Let me briefly offer some rea-
sons why, at least in theory, a strong theory of precedent-and a 
correspondingly reduced role for originialist reasoning- will re-
sult in more judicial restraint0 at least in the context of modern American constitutionallaw.2 
First, precedent provides a thicker body of norms with 
which to resolve constitutional disputes than originalism does. 
Take virtually any constitutional dispute you want on the recent 
docket of the Supreme Court-whether the Commerce Clause 
permits Congress to regulate the use of home-grown pot used for 
medical purposes,21 whether the Takings Clause permits prop-
erty to be condemned solely to promote economic develop-
ment/2 whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause per-
mits the execution of juveniles.23 A Court that tried to resolve 
these issues solely in accordance with the text and original un-
derstanding would have much less "stuff" to go on than a Court 
that tried to resolve these issues by examining precedent. The 
thinness of the set of relevant norms would make the outcome 
less predictable. In fact, if we could somehow conceive of a 
Court that tried to resolve each of these sorts of issues com-
pletely de novo, looking only at text and original understanding, 
the range of possible outcomes would be enormous. This is not 
to say that there is no difficulty in predicting the outcome once 
precedent is introduced. But the difficulty goes down. And if we 
posit that the Court would apply a strong theory of precedent, 
the difficulty of prediction goes down even further. 
The thickness of norms under a system of precedent is of 
course largely a contingent variable, depending on the age of the 
text in question and the volume of litigation it has generated 
since it was adopted. For the Marshall Court, attempting to con-
strue the Commerce Clause or the Contracts Clause, precedent 
was thin if not nonexistent. The text of the Constitution and the 
common understanding of the Framers' purposes may have sup-
20. I should emphasize that my argument rests on certain contingent features of 
American constitutional law. It is quite possible that with respect to other judicial func· 
tions, such as statutory interpretation or judicial review of agency action, decisional tech· 
niques other than precedent-following would produce greater judicial restraint. Defer· 
ring to longstanding and consistently held agency interpretations of statutes would be an 
example. 
21. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. a. 2195 (2005). 
22. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. a. 2655 (2005). 
23. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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plied a thicker body of norms. Today, however, the ratio is 
clearly reversed. Evidence of original understanding has ad-
vanced to some degree, with additional historical researches. But 
this is probably more than offset by the fact that the Justices 
have a very uneven sense of the Framers' purposes, since they 
are so remote in time. On the other hand, we now have nearly 
two hundred years worth of precedent construing provisions like 
the Commerce Clause and the Contracts Clause, and similar 
volumes of precedent for most other constitutional clauses liti-
gated with any degree of frequency. These precedents cover a 
great many issues that the original understanding materials do 
not address at all, at least not with any degree of specificity. 
Thus, it is much more likely that guidance will be found in 
precedent than in originalist materials.24 
Second, precedent is more accessible to lawyers and judges 
than evidence of original understanding. Not only is there more 
of it, it is easier to find. Supreme Court precedents are highly ac-
cessible. A full set of U.S. Reports resides in the chambers of 
every federal judge in the country, and is easily accessed by most 
state judges and practicing lawyers. These decisions have long 
been headnoted and indexed in various ways and collected in 
commentaries. Today of course they are on line and fully 
searchable electronically.25 The constitutional text is likewise 
highly accessible. But other evidence of original understanding is 
much less so. Records of the debates at the Convention were not 
published until more than half a century after the Constitution 
was ratified.26 And the debates at the ratifying conventions were 
often not recorded at all. For example, there are no records of 
the ratification debates for the Bill of Rights.27 
24. Studies by political scientists tend to be skeptical about the constraining force of 
precedent. See, e.g., SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE 
ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 ( 1995). But these 
studies may be misleading in their focus on overruling decisions, which represent a tiny 
fraction of the Court's workproduct. Jack Knight and Lee Epstein point out that prece-
dent is the dominant mode of justification in judicial opinions, and that the Justices spend 
significant amounts of time discussing precedents at their conferences on cases. JACK 
KNIGHT & LEE EPSTEIN, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 170-72 (1998). These behaviors 
are hard to explain if precedents are not perceived as having constraining force. 
25. SeeM. ETHAN KATSCH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF LAW (1989). 
26. Madison's "Notes" were not published until 1840. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON XXIV (Adrienne 
Koch ed. 1966). The first publication of a journal reporting on debates at the Convention 
occurred in 1819. !d. at viii. 
27. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 243 (1990). 
280 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:271 
Closely related to accessibility is the critical problem of how 
to define what counts as authority under a system of precedent 
as opposed to a system based on original understanding. Prece-
dent presents some familiar problems in this regard, such as how 
to distinguish between holding and dicta. But there is no ambi-
guity about what constitutes the outer limits of the database-
the full text of all published opinions of the Supreme Court. 
With respect to originalism, in contrast, once we leave the rela-
tively sparse text of the Constitution, there is no clear conven-
tion limiting what sorts of evidence count as authoritative. For 
example, legal scholars who debate the original understanding of 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment canvass an enor-
mous range of historical material, including contemporary stat-
utes and constitutions, contemporary judicial decisions constru-
ing these enactments, private correspondence, philosophical and 
political tracts, and sermons.28 Much of this material is available 
only in local historical archives. It is all potentially relevant in at-
tempting to fix the original understanding of these provisions, 
but most of it is not very accessible. Indeed, some of it has not 
yet been discovered. 
Again, we can see that the accessibility point is a contingent 
one. One can imagine a world in which only judgments of the 
Supreme Court opinions were published, not opinions, and 
where, conversely, great care was lavished on transcribing re-
cords of constitutional debates and distributing them to every 
courthouse in the nation. Similarly, one can imagine a world in 
which courts and lawyers spent little time determining how to 
glean what is authoritative in judicial opinions, and a great deal 
of time spelling out what is most authoritative in ascertaining 
original intent. Thus, we can imagine living in a world in which 
evidence of original understanding is more accessible than evi-
dence about precedent. But we do not live in such a world. The 
accessibility gap is probably narrowing a bit, as additional archi-
val material bearing on original understanding is reproduced and 
made available on line.29 Nevertheless, as almost any lawyer or 
judge will attest, it is far easier to research a constitutional ques-
tion using precedent than to attempt to recreate the original un-
derstanding.30 This too makes it easier to rule in accordance with 
28. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002). 
29. See, e.g., http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ (online edition of The Foun-
ders' Constitution (edited by Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner)). 
30. A particularly telling example is provided by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion 
in 44 Liquorrnart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,517-18 (1996). Justice Scalia opined 
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precedent than to try to rule in accordance with the original un-
derstanding. 
Third, the interpretation and application of precedent is 
more compatible with the skill set of the typical judge than is the 
interpretation and application of evidence of original under-
standing. Judges are trained in law, and law training, at least in 
this country, is grounded in the study of common law and the 
common law method. To a significant degree-and I recognize 
that this cuts against my thesis- this is training in the art of ma-
nipulation. Students are taught how to read precedents broadly 
and narrowly, how to exact principles not expressly stated, how 
to limit precedents to their facts. But training in the common law 
method is also-and this is less recognized-a socialization proc-
ess that allows the lawyer to recognize the difference between 
propositions that are settled, and hence are not eligible for ma-
nipulation, and propositions that remain unsettled, and hence 
open to divergent approaches. There is, lurking in the back-
ground, a conservative bias in favor of preserving what is settled, 
and limiting manipulation to the margins. 31 In this way the com-
mon law method, if it does not generate anything like perfect ju-
dicial restraint, at least produces a style of decisionmaking that is 
more restrained than some imaginable alternatives. 
Originalism, in contrast, if it is to be done well, requires a 
skill set that is beyond the ken of most lawyers and judges. Part 
of this reflects the generally dismal performance of American 
lawyers in matters of textual interpretation. Textual exegesis is 
poorly taught in American law schools. Perhaps as a conse-
quence, American lawyers have difficulty reading statutes and 
regulations carefully. When they are required to interpret these 
texts, they frequently revert to dogmatic assertions about plain 
meaning, wooden applications of various canons of interpreta-
tion, and opportunistic culling of legislative history materials for 
supporting quotations. Very few lawyers or judges have the tem-
perament or training to engage in a carefully considered struc-
that the proper degree of protection for commercial speech under the First Amendment 
should be determined by "the long accepted practices of the American people." /d. at 
517. In order to determine this, he said, it would be particularly relevant to know what 
the state legislative practices were toward commercial speech at the time of the adoption 
of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, he lamented, 
"[t]he parties and their amici provide no evidence on these points." /d. at 518. Instead, 
they discussed Supreme Court precedents. Evidently Justice Scalia did not have the time 
or energy to undertake to do the historical research himself, either. 
31. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 766-fJ7 (1988). 
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tural analysis of a text. Most cannot go beyond a clause-bound 
approach to textual interpretation, focusing on particular words 
and phrases rather than larger inferences about purpose and 
meaning. 
Even more problematically, insofar as originalist textual in-
terpretation is the alternative to precedent, and insofar as the 
text is relatively old-like the text of the U.S. Constitution-
even more severe professional disabilities come into play. Very 
few lawyers or judges have the skills of a professional historian 
seeking to imaginatively reconstruct the past. These skills in-
clude great patience and persistence in gathering all relevant ar-
chival material, and the ability to suspend judgment until having 
fully immersed oneself in this material. The project of original-
ism requires even more. Once the past is imaginatively recon-
structed, it is necessary to project the meanings gleaned from 
this exercise forward to new issues and factual circumstances 
never contemplated by the Framers. 32 The pitfalls here and 
many and obvious. 
I am not one who believes that the project of originalism is 
incoherent. It is simply very difficult, and very alien to the skill 
set of the typical lawyer and judge in America. To the extent we 
ask the Justices to tilt more toward originalism and away from 
precedent, we are asking them to perform a task that they are 
incompetent to do particularly well. This in turn would likely re-
sult in greater variability in outcomes, more room for manipula-
tion than even precedent provides, and hence less restraint. 
IV. EMPIRICISM ANYONE? 
Theory is one thing, proof another. It is obviously difficult 
to test a proposition such as the one I am contending for here: 
that a strong theory of precedent is more likely to produce judi-
cial restraint. But there are several sources of comparative evi-
dence that may shed light on the question. I will provide a sug-
gestive rather than an exhaustive account of these sources, and 
offer my own impressions of what a more complete investigation 
would reveal. 
First, it would be instructive to compare the behavior of the 
U.S. Supreme Court with courts of last resort in other legal sys-
32. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); Robert 
W. Bennett, The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 
647 (1985). 
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terns. Comparative law scholars have occasionally examined the 
proclivities of different national courts toward activism. These 
efforts invariably rank the U.S. Supreme Court as world cham-
pion of activists.33 There are no doubt a variety of explanations 
for this, including the heavy emphasis on rights in American cul-
ture, the opportunities for forum shopping created by federal-
ism, various types of subsidies provided to groups seeking to se-
cure social change through litigation, and the absence of a 
professional career path for American judges. But it is plausible 
that a weak theory of stare decisis also plays a role. A weak ad-
herence to precedent invites parties seeking social reform to in-
vest in constitutional litigation. If they succeed often enough in 
enlisting courts to adopt new social policies, the pipeline of liti-
gation will continually be refurbished with new legal theories, 
sponsored by both the left and the right. 
I suspect, but cannot prove, that a more complete survey of 
courts of last resort would show a strong correlation between the 
respect for precedent and proclivity toward activism. Certainly, 
the contrast between the U.S. Supreme Court and the appellate 
courts of England suggests such a relationship. The U.S. Su-
preme Court employs a weak theory of precedent in constitu-
tional law, and is notoriously activist. English courts, in contrast, 
follow a strong theory of stare decisis, and are generally re-
garded as highly restrained. Judge Richard Posner has observed 
the relationship between "the modesty of the English judges" 
and their commitment to stare decisis.34 He explains the rela-
tionship in jurisprudential terms. For English judges, precedent 
is law, and hence to overturn precedent is to engage in inappro-
priate judicial "legislation." Whatever the explanation, the hide-
bound attitude of English judges helps to account for a much 
lower level of litigation in England relative to the U.S. 
Other comparisons suggest a more complex relationship be-
tween precedent-following and activism. The Canadian Supreme 
Court, for example, has historically been more precedent-
minded than the U.S. Supreme Court. But the Canadian Court, 
in recent years, has thrown its support behind a "rights revolu-
tion" similar to the innovations sponsored by the Warren and 
33. See, e.g., JUDICIAL ACflVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2 (Kenneth M. 
Holland ed., 1991) (providing an overview of judicial activism in 11 countries and listing 
the United States courts being the "most active"). 
34. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN THE UK AND THE USA 90 
(1996). 
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Burger Courts in the U.S.35 A major cause of this change was the 
adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, which 
set forth a detailed menu of individual constitutional rights and 
encouraged judicial enforcement of those rights, including in-
validation of nonconforming legislation. In effect, Canadians 
voted for judicial activism, which means that the adventurous 
tum of its Supreme Court cannot be criticized on legitimacy 
grounds. It is simply carrying out the wishes of its People. In this 
respect, Canada is following a world-wide trend favoring in-
creased judicial involvement in setting and revising social pol-
icy- a trend which may suggest that judicial restraint, however 
important in theory, may be a value with a troubled future. 36 
Second, it would be revealing to compare the behavior of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in constitutional cases with its behavior 
in statutory construction cases. The Court generally follows a 
weak theory of precedent in constitutional cases, but at least 
purports to follow a strong theory of precedent with respect to 
statutory decisions. As Thomas Lee has shown, this "two-tier" 
approach to precedent is an innovation of the twentieth century, 
and rests on premises that are questionable at best.37 Neverthe-
less, the distinction is now well-entrenched. Moreover, it appar-
ently has real consequences: Beginning with the Hughes Court 
(1930-41), the Court has overruled many more constitutional 
precedents than statutory precedents, by a ratio of about 3 to 1.38 
Does the Court's weak theory of precedent in constitutional 
cases render it more activist, in the sense of being less predict-
able, in constitutional matters relative to statutory interpreta-
35. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACfiVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECfiVE 171-96 (1998). 
36. See RAN HlRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE NEW CoNSTITUTIONALISM (2004). 
37. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era 
to the Rehnquist Court, 52 V AND. L. REv. 647, 703-33 (1999). The weak theory of prece-
dent in constitutional law has been justified by the judicial oath to uphold the Constitu-
tion and by the need for "flexibility" in interpretation, given the difficulty of amending 
the Constitution. !d. at 710-11; 728-29. The oath argument overlooks the fact that, 
through the Supremacy Oause, judges are also bound to uphold statutes and treaties. 
The flexibility argument overlooks the fact that the Constitution was intentionally made 
difficult to amend, rendering judicial amendment through reinterpretation an evasion of 
a deliberate design principle. The strong theory of precedent in statutory law is justified 
in part by the assumption that congressional failure to overrule the precedent constitutes 
an implicit ratification. !d. at 732-33. This overlooks the familiar objection that congres-
sional failure to act is ordinarily is not given the force of law because this is inconsistent 
with the bicameral and presentment requirements for the enactment of legislation. 
38. See Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of 
Natural Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262,263 (1992) (Table 1). 
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tion? Although it would be difficult to answer this question with 
rigorous proof, there is little doubt in my mind that the answer is 
yes. The major innovations associated with the Supreme Court-
such as outlawing segregation, mandating one person one vote in 
legislative districting, restricting gender discrimination, limiting 
the use of the death penalty, creating rights to abortion and to 
engage in homosexual relations, wiping out governmental efforts 
to control pornography on the internet-have come in constitu-
tional rulings. It is difficult to think of rulings of equivalent inno-
vation rendered as a matter of statutory interpretation. 
To be sure, it is possible that the Court's preference for us-
ing the Constitution as a vehicle for innovative policymaking 
simply reflects its strategic perception that it can "get away with 
it" when it rules as a matter of constitutional law, whereas inno-
vation in statutory interpretation would be vulnerable to legisla-
tive overruling. To the extent this explanation is plausible, the 
Court's embrace of a weak theory of precedent in constitutional 
cases may be more the effect, rather than the cause, of its com-
mitment to innovation in constitutional law. I admit there is 
some force to this analysis. Still, given the evidence that judges 
behave differently in different cultures and at different levels of 
the judicial hierarchy, and that these differences have something 
to do with the judicial attitude toward precedent, it is plausible 
to think that a judicial commitment to a strong theory of prece-
dent would have some constraining force on judicial willingness 
to engage in social engineering in constitutional law, at least at 
the margins. 
Third, it is worth comparing the constitutional jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court and the lower courts. The Supreme Court 
follows a weak theory with regard to its own constitutional 
precedents, whereas the lower courts are regarded as being abso-
lutely bound by these precedents.39 Sometimes this is referred to 
as the contrast between horizontal and vertical stare decisis. In 
our system of constitutional law, horizontal stare decisis is weak 
and vertical stare decisis is strong. This provides another point of 
comparison in evaluating the effects of different degrees of 
strength of precedent-following behavior. 
39. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); Rodriguez de Quijas 
v.Shearson/Arnerican Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). See also Evan H. Carninker, 
Why Must Inferior Couns Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 
(1994). 
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One interesting contrast between the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts as constitutional interpreters concerns the range 
of authorities they rely upon. The Supreme Court, as we have 
seen, relies primarily on its own precedent in resolving constitu-
tional cases. But it frequently supplements consideration of 
precedent with other types of authority, such as social policy, 
precedent from other legal systems, and occasionally even origi-
nal understanding. Lower courts, in contrast, resolve constitu-
tional cases almost exclusively in terms of applicable Supreme 
Court precedent. This contrast in the range of authorities con-
sidered is consistent with what we would expect, given the dif-
ferent theories of precedent in each area. Under a weak theory 
of precedent, it is always possible that some other types of au-
thority will indicate that a precedent is in error and should be 
overruled. Thus, everything that is logically relevant should be 
considered. Under a strong theory of precedent, if there is 
precedent on point, that generally ends the matter. There is no 
point in going further. 
The fact that lower courts rarely venture beyond Supreme 
Court precedent provides some inferential support for the sup-
position that a strong theory of precedent is at least potentially 
restraining. If Supreme Court precedent is regarded as suffi-
ciently binding, that body of norms is generally thick enough and 
accessible enough so that there is little or no need to supplement 
it with other sources of authority. It is also plausible to suppose 
that decisions rendered following one interpretative methodol-
ogy will be more predictable than decisions rendered using mul-
tiple methodologies. 
Empirical support for these suppositions is provided by the 
observation, which again I believe to be true but again cannot 
rigorously prove, that relatively few constitutional innovations 
originate in the lower courts. Most innovations come from the 
Supreme Court itself. Certainly this is true of the desegregation 
decisions, the one-person, one-vote decisions, and the abortion 
decisions. Moreover, lower courts are often reluctant to expand 
upon innovative Supreme Court decisions decided by close mar-
gins, until they are confident that the Court intends to adhere to 
the innovation in the future.40 Since the Supreme Court and the 
40. Commentators have observed this behavior with respect to the Court's federal-
ism decisions of the 1990s, most of which were adopted in 5-4 rulings. For example, the 
initial reaction by the lower courts to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invali-
dating the Gun-Free School Zone Act as exceeding congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause), was quite cautious. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P. Denrung, 
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lower courts are looking at the same body of Supreme Court 
precedent, these observations suggest that the stronger the the-
ory of precedent, the greater the reluctance of courts to engage 
in constitutional innovation. 
Of course, there may be other reasons, like selection effects, 
that also explain the relative degree of innovation in the two 
court systems. The Supreme Court considers only the most diffi-
cult constitutional questions, as to which lower courts are often 
in disagreement. But I doubt this is the entire explanation. Con-
stitutional law is a vast enterprise today, and there are a great 
many specific issues that have been addressed only by lower 
courts, not the Supreme Court. In resolving these issues, lower 
courts extrapolate from Supreme Court decisions, yet they do so 
in a way that generally attracts little attention, certainly not 
enough to trigger Supreme Court review. In other words, lower 
courts practice constitutional law in a more restrained, no-
surprises fashion than does the Supreme Court itself. This in 
turn suggests that if the Supreme Court adopted a stronger the-
ory of stare decisis, it too would become more restrained in its 
constitutional decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude with a final observation, which is that law 
professors are probably not the optimal group to arbitrate the 
question of whether courts should tilt more toward originalism 
or stare decisis in cases of constitutional doubt. Judicial restraint 
is greatly undervalued in legal academia, relative to the signifi-
cance it is given by most ordinary citizens. One reason is that ju-
dicial restraint is boring. Academics overwhelmingly prefer 
dashing and innovative judges-judges who remake institutions, 
declare new rights, transform social values-if only because this 
style of judging is much more interesting. Another reason is in-
stitutional interest. Activist judging exalts the role of manipula-
tors of legal arguments-including of course legal academics-in 
the political system. Judicial restraint, in contrast, conceives of 
lawyering as a craft rather than as social engineering, which puts 
Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional 
Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wise. L. REv. 369; Deborah Jones Merritt, Com-
merce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 712-729 (1995). Only after Lopez was reaffirmed did 
lower courts begin to venture forth with selective invalidations of federal statutes. See, 
e.g., United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Congress lacks 
power under Commerce Gause to prohibit possession of homemade machine gun). 
288 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:271 
the manipulators of legal argument in a much less heady posi-
tion. 
Nonlawyers would therefore be well advised to pay little 
heed to what legal academics have to say about the correct style 
of judging. They should instead insist on a judicial selection 
process that gives maximum weight to picking the most boring 
possible individuals to serve on our courts. Plodding, precedent-
following judges may exasperate academics. But courts filled 
with plodders will give strength to rule of law values like protect-
ing expectations and assuring equality of treatment among liti-
gants. A Supreme Court filled with plodders could do even 
more-it could help revitalize our beleaguered democracy. 
